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Logistics Over-the-Shore (LOTS) operations have been a part of the U.S.
military's strategy for enabling operational maneuver and sustainment of forces since the colonial era. Logistics operations support the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces from installations and depots across the strategic, operational, and tactical spectrums of war. Strategic logistics is one part of a system that supports national policy by other means. Army logistics operations enable maneuver at the most fundamental level; logistics provide the means to maintain the military advantage. This SRP examines the history of Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) operations, the current strategic environment, the relevancy of JLOTS operations, the role in strategic response capabilities, and the options and ongoing initiatives to overcome shortfalls and increase relevance, in particular in the U.S. Pacific Command's (USPACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). The relevance of logistics depends on application of effective logistics enablers at the right time and place to support our armed forces.
The U.S. military has employed amphibious operations to support its tactical, operational, and strategic objectives throughout history. According to Donald Boose, the U.S. military's amphibious heritage began in the colonial era: The geography of the North American continent, with its multiple waterways, was ideal for waterborne operations. 1 He further explains that British and colonial troops' conduct of a series of expeditions against the French in 1645 are the earliest recorded amphibious operations in North America. 2 U.S. interests around the world drove the Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps to pursue amphibious doctrine and program development after the end of the World War I. Modern amphibious operations began in World War II when they were employed for combat assaults onto beaches. Donald Boose describes the various 2 operations during World War II that were conducted throughout the Pacific theater of operations that supported the Mediterranean theater of operations, that were used to invade the Aleutian Islands, and that ultimately supported the Allied Forces' crosschannel invasion of Europe during Operation Overlord at Normandy. 3 The U.S. military used amphibious operations again during the Korean War in support of combat operations. However, during the Korean War, troops, cargo, and equipment often had to be transferred from ships anchored in a harbor by means of various landing ships, landing craft, and other lighters to be carried ashore. These transfers were necessary because of inadequate dock facilities or tidal variance on the west coast of the peninsula. 4 These sustainment operations developed into our current LOTS operations.
In 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Implementation Plan established U.S.
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and designated it as the organization with oversight responsibilities for JLOTS programs. 5 Strategic sealift is a USTRANSCOM core mission that entails delivery of forces and their sustainment into a theater of operation. As a functional combatant command with global visibility of strategic transportation requirements and ongoing operations, its oversight of JLOTS capabilities provides the Department of Defense (DOD) with a single source for fulfilling requirements to move cargo ashore. USTRANSCOM supports the deployment process by providing strategic movement of forces and materiel around the world in support of operational commanders. 6 These strategic transportation movements are carried out by airlift and sealift of forces and cargo to locations around the world. As the most costeffective and fastest way to deliver large quantities of material in one lift, sealift accounts for 90 percent of all DOD cargo movements. 7 USTRANSCOM now needs the 3 capability to deploy forces and provide logistics support in A2/AD areas where seaports have been denied or damaged, or are inadequate or non-existent. 8 JLOTS provides a viable logistics course of action to deliver forces and sustainment into an area of operation.
Military history has proven undeniably that the capability to project forces onto unprepared beaches and to sustain those forces during combat operations using beaches and in-stream discharges remains a credible requirement. The U.S. military used and refined over-the-shore amphibious operations and LOTS operations throughout the 20th century. LOTS capabilities were used in Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and during both wars with Iraq. 9 Twenty-first century operations have proven to be no different in the matter of projecting and sustaining forces in these environments, just as the U.S. military depends on large modern ports to project power.
But a potential adversary may attempt to deny or delay the deployment of forces through simple methods -through the use of mines, submarines, special forces, terrorism, sabotage, or tactical ballistic missiles.
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The 21 st century strategic environment presents a new challenge to the United States: Future adversaries will rely on a strategy to deny U.S. access to critical areas to limit the U.S. military's reach. Potential adversaries have developed new weapons that provide the ability to deny U.S. forces access to seaports, waterways, and key terrain. This guidance focused on countering emerging threats; it rebalanced the U.S. security focus toward the Asia-Pacific region. 14 This change acknowledges that the U.S.
economic system and interests are closely intertwined with the security and prosperity of that region. 15 China's economic growth and expanding military power created the 6 conditions that led to the revised U.S. global strategy. Forsaking "Shock and awe" and large-scale operations, the new strategy has shifted to reliance on partner engagement and theater shaping in the Asia-Pacific region. 16 In the current strategic environment, China looms as the next adversary capable of challenging U.S. interests -especially in the Asia-Pacific region. 17 China's economic growth provides the means to continue to build its military and continue to challenge regional neighbors. China's naval power poses a potential threat to the region's sea lines of communication, with implications for global commerce. Oceans cover a vast amount of the earth's surface. And the Pacific Ocean is the largest -covering almost a third of the planet. 18 The U.S. strategy is designed to protect its interests around the world -interests that are important to the nation's survival, that are vital for its economic prosperity, and that are needed for its allies and partners to maintain a balance of power throughout the world.
Recent actions by the Chinese government have created tension with other nations in the region. China continues to contest historical ownership of various islands and waterways; it continues to exert its regional influence; it has the potential to change the balance of power in the Pacific Rim. The U.S. military will continue to execute strategic missions that include protecting the global commons, reassuring partners and allies of its commitment, and fighting and winning conflicts when necessary. 19 As a global power with global interests, the United States maintains freedom of navigation across the sea domain and enables the flow of commerce across the ocean. It demonstrates resolve to counter likely threats -even into areas where potential 7 adversaries attempt to deny access through both long-range and short-range tactics known as Anti-access/Area-denial (A2/AD). 20 Current economic conditions throughout the world and fiscal constraints on the U.S. military will significantly affect future military capabilities. Our national military strategy will have to critically assess the nation's ability to overcome challenges in global response to threats in order to support the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). All tools of U.S. power -diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME)
-will be used to influence and shape the strategic environment. To meet the challenges of the 21st century, the Joint Force will rely on a limited forward posture, power projection, and prepositioning to counter threats in the strategic environment. This force will be smaller and rapidly employable; it will aggregate, reconfigure, and disaggregate as required. 21 Significantly, JLOTS-capable forces that are forward-based along with prepositioned equipment will enable the entry of forces into an area of operations and will enable long-term sustainment.
The new strategic environment requires the U.S. military to maintain capabilities to overcome A2/AD challenges -not unlike the need to execute amphibious or JLOTS operations throughout U.S. history. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) lists ten primary missions of the U.S. military: One is to be able to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged.
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A JLOTS operation can provide this capability. JLOTS has clear relevance in the current strategic environment.
The Joint Force can prevail over A2/AD campaigns through use of the capabilities inherent in the U.S. Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Army. Doctrinally, the U.S. Marine
Corps conducts an amphibious operation to secure a beach or other facilities. This 8 allows entry of Navy vessels to discharge cargo and supplies. Then a follow-on JLOTS operation moves other combat forces and sustainment ashore.
The U.S. military has dramatically reduced its forward presence since the end of the Cold War and throughout the beginning of the 21 st century. The U.S. strategy now relies more on CONUS-based power projection forces that depend on U.S.
Transportation Command's strategic airlift and sealift, part of the strategic mobility triad, to rapidly respond to a wide range of threats. The U.S. strategic mobility triad consists of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning. 23 Prepositioned equipment and supplies that are forward-based in strategic locations around the world facilitate rapid deployment by reducing the sealift requirements for heavy combat forces. Prepositioned equipment validates U.S. commitment to allies and partners around the world. The prepositioned stocks include capabilities that take longer to strategically deploy to an operational area; they include high-demand but low-density Army watercraft and other LOTS equipment.
The LOTS equipment provides the capability for Joint Forces to conduct JLOTS operations to overcome A2/AD challenges and demonstrate U.S. capability to move its forces securely to shore.
Even though the U.S. forward presence has been reduced, a credible forward U.S. posture is maintained with some strategically located forward-based forces capable of deterring and countering potential adversaries until arrival of follow-on CONUS-based forces. This forward basing includes limited JLOTS-capable Army watercraft.
The U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy both have LOTS capabilities in support of their Title 10 missions; however, they seldom conduct LOTS operations independent of each other. USTRANSCOM describes JLOTS as an operation in which the Army and the Navy establish LOTS operations combined under a unified commander or Joint Task force. 24 In his Army Logistician article, Nathaniel Glover designates LOTS operations as logistics operations that move forces and sustainment by utilizing lighterage for subsequent discharge over a bare beach or into a suitable port. 25 Joint Publication 4-01.6 further explains that during these operations, cargo is discharged from deep draft ships that cannot navigate into commercial seaports due to port limitations. 26 Regardless of the various attempts to define LOTS operations, they are an important enabler; often they require many mutually supporting efforts.
DoD Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major
Components, specifies Army and Navy LOTS requirements. Each Service has developed LOTS programs and acquired equipment to meet their requirements. Each
Service's unique missions have shaped the type of capabilities they developed, fielded, and used to support their operations -capabilities that are needed in joint operations.
The Navy's program is designed to support Marine amphibious operations, whereas the Army's program supports theater logistics and intra-coastal transportation operations. 27 The Army's LOTS requirements include "conduct riverine operations" and "provide logistics to joint operations and campaigns, including joint over-the-shore and intra-theater transport of time-sensitive, mission-critical personnel and materiel." 28 The Navy developed its capabilities to "conduct riverine operations" and "provide naval expeditionary logistics to enhance the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of naval forces and other forces operating within the maritime domain, to include joint sea bases, and provide sea transport for the Armed Forces other than that which is organic to the individual Military Services and USSOCOM." 29 To carry out these designated tasks, both services budget and develop appropriate programs and equipment.
Regardless of the specific differences in the Army and Navy LOTS programs, they have common capabilities to move cargo from ship to shore. Because most strategic and operational missions are conducted in a Joint environment, interoperable equipment is needed to provide seamless transfer of equipment from ship to shore.
Each Service's causeway systems provide an example of common equipment with different characteristics. Both the Army and Navy developed individualized causeway systems for their respective missions. The Army's system is designed to fit into container cells of a containership, which enables deployments because it is modular and easily configured. 30 The Navy developed a larger system, the elevated causeway system (ELCAS) that is more difficult to install. 31 The ELCAS does not interface well with Army lighterage. In pursuit of its global interests, the United States must maintain its capability to project military force into any region of the world. Indeed, large-scale deployments have always depended on intertheater sealift. 34 The U.S. capability to project forces has been practically unrestricted since World War II. 35 The Joint Operational Access Concept Moving equipment from CONUS to an operational area is not in itself sufficient.
Our modern military requires suitable seaports of debarkation in order to conduct and sustain operations. 37 When seaports of debarkation are not available due to geography or an adversary's A2/AD tactics, amphibious operations followed by JLOTS operations provide the capability to deploy and sustain land-based forces. This capability is enhanced by the U.S. military's ability to conduct over-the-shore and in-stream operations when access to seaports of debarkation has been hindered. There will always be situations in which ideal ports are denied or are substandard -or are too far from the operational area. Prepositioned storage of JLOTS-capable equipment in APS provides the capability to rapidly deploy forces to an area of operations. However, other factors impact their employment. Even though APS issue procedures emphasize speed and efficiency, APS equipment must be tailored and configured for a given specific purpose after it is issued. 41 Once JLOTS equipment has been issued, the equipment must be transported to its designated users or area of operation. 42 Geography as well as time and distance factors impact its movement to the final employment site. USPACOM'S AOR is so vast that this movement could take considerable time. In an article in Army Sustainment, Colonel Hickens shows that unless prepositioned assets are within 100 miles of their final employment location, they will probably arrive too late to affect an operation.
43 Table 1 . Army Prepositioned JLOTS Assets 44 As part of the forward-basing and rapid response strategy, the Army distributed a small number of watercraft and JLOTS enablers forward. One Logistics Support Vessel (LSV) currently supports operations out of Kuwait; three are available in Hawaii. 45 In support of theater contingency plans, each of these AORs also have 27 pre-positioned watercraft assets, including one Modular Causeway System each in APS-4 and APS-5 storage. 46 Forward-stationing and prepositioning of Army watercraft significantly reduce the response time to support combatant commanders. As the Asia-Pacific region assumes greater strategic significance, the Army should consider increasing logistics capacity there and reducing response times. This would require a serious review of the JLOTS capabilities currently in CONUS and possibly require relocations of equipment to the Asia-Pacific. We have an opportunity to greatly increase the available payload capability and to reduce response time in the region. To project power on an expeditionary basis, force projection of CONUS-based forces remains a major means in U.S. strategy to protect its interests around the world.
Force projection enables us to relocate military resources from CONUS or another theater in response to requirements to military operations. 48 Force projection is executed in five stages: mobilization (applies to Reserve forces only), deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. 49 The force projection of JLOTS equipment primarily from the Active Component battalions at Joint Base Langley-Eustis provides the capability to overcome anti-access measures to seaports of debarkation.
But this capability comes at the expense of time. On the other hand, JLOTS assets already in a theater of operations provide the Combatant Commander flexibility in employing and sustaining forces. They also provide the capability to move forces ashore when seaport access is denied. Combatant commanders must submit a Request for Forces (RFF) to obtain additional JLOTS assets other than the few that are already forward-deployed to the USPACOM and USCENTCOM AORS. 59 Following approval, the deployment of JLOTS equipment adds additional time -time to either self-deploy, sealift, or issue the equipment from APS/MPS. These requirements delay access to these capabilities. 60 During Kosovo operations, it took 23 days to move two LSVs from CONUS to an equipment site in Italy. 61 According to USTRANSCOM, JLOTS would have effectively supported strategic movement of forces and sustainment into a theater of operations during the U.S. response to the Southeast Asia tsunami in Japan. 62 For the U.S.
response to the earthquake in Haiti, USTRANSCOM noted the delay in movement of JLOTS assets to U.S. Southern Command while awaiting approval of an RFF. Army watercraft and marine terminal community of interest needed a strong advocate to continue pushing the Army's force structure resourcing and equipment funding requirements.
As part of a long-term strategy to move combat forces and cargo to meet operational requirements, the Army Expeditionary Intermodal Operations (AEIO) concept addresses capability shortfalls and proposes doctrine and materiel and solutions. AEIO identifies capabilities to move personnel, equipment, and cargo into and through sea-based ports, land-based ports, and on to staging areas. 66 The AEIO addresses capability requirements to interface with other services, with the interagency, and with commercial platforms, ports, and facilities. A current shortcoming of JLOTS-capable equipment within both the Army and Navy is its lack of interoperability. 67 To upgrade JLOTS, Army leaders must replace vessels in the aging watercraft fleet and create solutions for connectivity with the future seabasing concept. 68 The AEIO cites four areas to develop in order to utilize Army capabilities for seabasing: connectivity to the Mobile Landing Platform, sea-state mitigation, dynamic positioning systems for Army waterborne assets, and development of sea-based staging/support bases. 69 Once approved, the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for the AEIO concept will propose multiple materiel solutions for the Transportation Corps.
In order to increase the strategic relevance of JLOTS in the new strategic environment, the Army needs to explore interoperability within the Navy's seabasing concept. The capability to project power from the sea directly into an operational area despite A2/AD obstruction will be a primary requirement to overcome those challenges.
Potential adversaries will deny entry to fixed ports and staging bases, so JLOTS capabilities to move cargo ashore could provide an alternate access to the area of operations. Seabasing currently relies on naval and expeditionary warfare to project power from the sea in order to ensure access to operational areas from the sea. This concept developed out of the U.S. Marine Corps' vision to provide a means to conduct operational maneuver from the sea without reliance on land-based facilities. 
